On the Economic Policy and Philosophy of the Hellenistic Era

  When one reflects upon the annals of history, and the innumerable axioms, aphorisms, institutions, veracities, and inquiries that have permeated civil society since the dawn of civilization – one can often feel dwarfed in comparison to the grandeur of the spectacle that is eternity.  For throughout the millennia; countless names, dates, events, philosophies, and empires have echoed mellifluously into the present-day, and continue to influence the world we live in through not only their direct tangible impact but through the ideas that have been transcribed throughout the ages. However, the allure of great men and their herculean feats can often – as I can attest – captivate the mind to such a degree, that the everyday institutions, veracities, and histories can often be overlooked or even forgotten. For although the achievements and accolades of those the likes of Cyrus, Alexander, and Caesar undoubtedly shaped the world around them – it is far too often that we forget the everyday factors and veracities that characterized the regular, everyday lives of the general populace throughout history – and as the axiomatic verities of our society in the present day can elucidate, few realms of inquiry have delivered a greater impact upon a civilization and her prosperity than Economy. For it is the Economy, and the philosophy thereof – that has universally dictated the wealth, management of resources, trade, industry, livelihoods, interpersonal and international relations, and the prosperity of civilizations Ancient and Modern alike – throughout the millennia.

   For, it has been of utmost veracity and candor throughout every civilization, every period of history, and every doctrine of thought that can acceptably be designated rational, that economic policy ought to be crafted and implemented as best befitting the circumstances at hand – yet such a broad, overarching aphorism has often led to an immense degree of interpretation and human error throughout history, alongside the necessity of adequate Economic knowledge of the natural laws of economics, and the cycles (the ebbs and flows) thereof. Yet these axioms and principles are most durably tested and challenged, however, during the periods of history in which Societal, especially technological change – is most prevalent, which have fostered the greatest conflict and philosophical inquiry. Whether it be during the dawn of Agriculture when the livelihoods of societies evolved from a primitive, arguably pre-economic society to one of agricultural growth, the dawn of civilization, government, and for the first time, the trading of goods between settlements. Or perhaps, during the rise of greater development and international trade, such as during the advent of the Silk Road, in which greater internal improvements and regulation were necessary not only for the safety and prosperity of those involved in trade but the progress of the civilizations who ensured it. Furthermore, periods such as the Age of Exploration, the Industrial Revolution, and now the present Digital Revolution have required entirely new outlooks, philosophies, and assessments of the institutions and veracities that govern the day, as civilization does its best to look after government, and government to look after civilization – both with prosperity in mind. For these epochs, these zeniths of the centuries have often been highly volatile and consequential for the coming centuries, as the fate of entire civilizations lies in the hands of uncertainty. Although these periods have undoubtedly been uncertain and petrifying for those residing within them – they are not only remarkably fascinating for the modern eye but can present a plentitude of valuable information for the modern era, which can be of immeasurable value for any society facing daunting new challenges and uncertainties.

    In few eras of history – however – have these principles been more tangibly tested and challenged than during the period of the Hellenistic Era, which can be argued was perhaps the greatest period of geopolitical, societal change across the known world since the Dawn of Agriculture and maybe the anarchy of the Bronze Age Collapse. For within the Hellenistic Era, centuries of preceding events had culminated in a new societal order that would forever change the nature of the world, as Greek and Western culture, ideas, philosophies, and policies were spread across thousands of miles following the conquests and the demise of Alexander, fostering immense cultural and ideological synthesis: and, following centuries of laissez-faire, hands-off Persian governance, much of the world’s traditional socio-economic systems appeared to be for the first time facing solid, external alteration and change – as the world grew more culturally, economically, and socially interconnected than ever before through Hellenic influence. Furthermore, as solid trade routes that would eventually amalgamate into the Silk Road were being sown, and various technologies were presenting the closest the ancient world had yet come to a diversification of economy and industry – the economic model of civilizations had been expanded and complicated. Moreover, the impact of external powers such as the rising Roman Republic, Parthian Invasions, increased interaction with Eastern, oriental societies, and conflict between the respective, Hellenistic kingdoms – all of which collectively coincided with a period of unique prosperity and development, thus making the Hellenistic Era perhaps one of the most economically fascinating, yet predominantly overlooked periods in the history of the world.

   Therefore, it shall be our objective today to attempt to gauge not only the Hellenistic Era Economic Policy, and the Economic systems utilized within the primary Hellenistic Civilizations (the Ptolemaic, Seleucid, and Antigonid Empires respectively), but also the philosophical conflicts between various schools of economic thought, the adaptation of old Greek theories to Hellenistic Circumstances, the impact of the emergence of Rome on the Hellenistic Kingdoms, and lastly, how historians and economists throughout the millennia have understood and interpreted the Economics of the Hellenistic Era, before attempting to internalize Hellenistic Economics through both a time-appropriate and modern perspective. For, it is with utmost alacrity that I assert the fundamental theme of Hellenistic Era economics was that of synthesis, and the conflict around it; of traditional Greek Economic theories and philosophical ideals with the complex economic traditions and circumstances of the lands now under Hellenistic rule, with their own unique debates and primary solutions of what can be dubbed State-Directed growth, the Solicitation of Trade, and State-Corporate Collaboration and dependency within the Ptolemaic, Seleucid, and Antigonid kingdoms respectively – all while balancing foreign intervention, and the decadence of ancient courts. The study and historiography of Hellenistic Economics, however, serve to inform us not only about the time period in general but as much about the philosophy and worldview of the historians who record the era, as the Hellenistic Era itself, and therefore their research can be internalized as not only a study of the period in question, but a snapshot of the world for which it came from.

   First and foremost, before we can begin to entertain Hellenistic Era Economic Policy, we must seek to ascertain a rudimentary understanding of the Classical Greek Economic consensus beforehand, alongside some of the burgeoning philosophical ideals that were beginning to impart a greater impact upon the wider Hellenistic World by the resolution of the Era of the Diadochi (323-281 BCE). For Greek Economic theory was perhaps one of the more illustrious, well-recorded schools of Ancient Economics, with records dating back to the poet Hesiod – a contemporary of Homer, who predated the philosophers of the Classical Age by several centuries – who asserted and observed what can be understood as economics in it’s most natural (not necessarily optimal) form following the emergence of the Greek Dark Ages, in what we today would understand as traditional, laissez-faire market economics. For these observations of economics and transactions in a fairly unobstructed manner, resembling in a great deal the proverbial law of the jungle in its most unadulterated, primitive form – would constitute much of the basis of Economic transactions and later policy within the Greek city-states, which in their earlier period, like many other city-state economies, relied upon a similar function of trade (it is worth noting, however, that Hesiod’s economic work was less of an independent thesis in it’s own right, and more a natural, eloquently phrased observation of events and circumstances as they appeared to him).

   As the city-states of Greece gradually evolved and progressed, various economic policies and institutions were attempted and implemented depending on the city to alleviate potential conditions of poverty among the populace (however they were very rudimentary by modern standards), with cities such as Sparta instituting familial programs and allotments for citizens that can be understood as an Ancient equivalent of rudimentary welfare policy (one that since Lycurgus was fundamentally tied to the Military), while Athens (the forerunner in political, economic, metaphysical, ethical, and dialectical philosophy) attempted to during the age of Pericles’ dabble in Central Banking and both excise taxes and tariffs at the steady rate of 1 %, alongside guaranteeing a very minimal forerunner to social security and resource security amongst members of the various Demes (Tribes/Subdivisions) of Athens as instituted by Cleisthenes in 508 BCE.

It is worth noting, however, that despite the prosperity of many of these city-states, many of them relied disproportionately on colonial holdings and subsidiaries (such as the Delian League for Athens), alongside large slave populations, sometimes ranging upwards of 80 percent of a given city, that facilitated for states like Athens to prosper. Interestingly, as per the studies of pre-eminent scholars on the matter, the estimated GDP of cities like Athens per capita, was greater than that of the entire Achaemenid Empire (albeit, Athens was a singular, highly prosperous enclave). However, it is certain that these principles of economic thought and society undoubtedly permeated the thought process of Hellenistic administrators who sought to effectively manage their domains. Furthermore, there was an increasingly prevalent degree of influence not only of the Philosophical doctrines of Plato, Aristotle, and (to a lesser degree) Xenophon – all of whom attempted to present their theses’ for the betterment of a society, involving the particular conflict between the utopian idealism of Plato as opposed to the more realist, yet still undoubtedly communalist, proto-republican pragmatism of Aristotle – but there was the interpretation of these schools by Alexander (who was specifically indoctrinated in the Aristotelian school, with a unique monarchical lense as instructed by his father Philip II) , who sought to establish this almost idealized societal vision of a harmonic, singular, universally prosperous empire in which concordance between Greek and Barbarian (in a classical sense of the term) could be achieved. For these underlying factors, alongside the trend of militarism amongst the Diadochi, were the defining features and characteristics of the mindsets of Early Hellenistic rulers at the precipice of their Kingdoms, and the understanding thereof enables us to gauge their ancestral perspective when addressing Economic policy, in their newly established Kingdoms beginning during the Early 3rd Century BCE.

   Secondly, the Hellenistic Kingdoms all had to face a similar problem, in that they had to synthesize and effectively balance their own economic theses’, models, and policies that had previously prevailed in the Greek world of thought, alongside the traditional economic metrics and institutions of their newly consolidated domains. For instance, the Ptolemaic Kingdom which had consisted predominantly of Egypt and the surrounding territories, largely had to contend with and synthesize prior understandings of economic policy with the traditional Egyptian methodisms of economics which had predated Greek economic consensus by several millennia and had not only a longstanding tradition of functionality and potential for revenue, but also the ability to be entirely self-sustainable if need be and the environmental conditions were decent. The traditional Egyptian Economy had been, due to a number of reasons including the Absolute power of the Pharaoh in Egyptian everyday life (which, by Greek standards, was at its height intolerably tyrannical), the geographical, agricultural, and logistical nature of the Nile being optimal for a highly centralized, bureaucratically reliant state, with the ability to prosper  (as Egypt had been the case since the Old Kingdom of the 3rd Millenium BCE) – alongside for most of its early history not necessarily requiring a high degree of trade to survive (something that gradually changed over millennia), with all of these veracities delineating traditional Egyptian economics as highly distinct from the more individualized Greek School, and unfathomably more hierarchical. This system, however, with a strong state-centralization of the economy (as could be expected of the first-ever highly centralized nation-state in human history), had with the sole exception of slight relaxations of policy and adaptations away from the hyper-traditionalism of old Egypt following the Bronze Age Collapse had remained largely constant since the 4th Millenium BCE, and therefore presented a consistent yet largely reliable model for Ptolemy I Soter, at least as a starting point for future economic development.

   Meanwhile, the Seleucid Empire, which largely consisted of the territories of Syria, much of Anatolia, Mesopotamia, and nominally much of Persia proper – in other words, a majority of the lands of the former Achaemenid Empire, that had operated on a laissez-faire style of governance, despite enacting considerable tributes on certain provinces (namely Egypt and provinces bordering India), and profiting off of interprovince and international trade that naturally passed within and through the multinational empire at it’s height, yet by her fall to Alexander in 330 BCE, the empire’s economic condition had vastly deteriorated due to decadence, economic mismanagement, instability in leadership, questionable utilization of funds, and numerous highly costly revolts and a decline in trade. The Seleucid Empire also had to contend with a fairly questionable currency policy lingering from the old Achaemenid Empire, who during the final decades of sharp instability had failed to effectively circulate a widely standardized currency metric as they had during the reigns of Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes. Furthermore, the devaluation of already existing coins following the decades-long conflict of the Diadochi presented the Seleucids not only with the problem of restoring trade but also restoring standardized currency and distributing it throughout the empire without the risk of unmitigated inflation that has often occurred throughout the millennia when given these same circumstances. Furthermore, the Antigonids in Macedonia, much of Dorian Greece, and nominally portions of the Ionian Coast had to fend with not only a declining economy and an increasing reliance on imports and trade with Egypt, but a withered treasury following decades of denigration during the Wars of the Diadochi, alongside rising Roman influence, and the continuous persistence of nominally independent city-states, who continued to pester the Antigonid administration.

   Beyond these pre-existing circumstances, the fundamental defining factor of prosperity from 281 BCE onwards would be merit, and how each of the kingdoms attempted to fundamentally address the difficulties at hand. Regarding both the administrations of the Ptolemaic and Seleucid empires, their attempts at monetary policy to facilitate internal revenue and prosperity were uniquely tailored to the circumstances to which they were bequeathed their domains – with the former being considerably more state-centric and agrarian, while the latter emphasized an ancient equivalent of developmentalism and policy designed to elicit trade and economic engagement, alongside the construction of cities along trade routes to facilitate that goal. For throughout the nearly three-centuries of Ptolemaic Egypt’s existence, the fundamental Economic conflict and scholarly debate had been a rather familiar sounding controversy to us today, the debate primarily between administrators and scholars in Alexandria between state-directed and laissez-faire economic policy.

It is here that we must acknowledge the perspectives that shall impact our understanding on the research, namely, that of our own perspective and perception’s upon the Economic systems of the Hellenistic Era through a modern lens (one that has largely been impacted by modern philosophy, vernacular, and post-industrial policy, as opposed to the economies’ of antiquity, which to us seem highly agrarian and rudimentary yet are still the source of great knowledge). Secondly, the perspectives of those who present to us primary knowledge on the matter, primarily the contemporary source of Polybius, the Greek-turned-Roman historian and pre-eminent academic of the day (who interestingly was close friends with Scipio Africanus and Aemilianus), who based his studies on observations, comparisons, and direct analysis and the later source of Ibn Khaldun, who utilized much of the literary resources accessible during the Islamic Golden Age of Hellenistic, Classical Greek, and Roman histories’ that were ultimately lost to centuries – both of whom had unique understandings’ and considerable (yet not delegitimizing) biases, like any recorder of events with the ability to make a quintessential observation. Polybius, who transcribed much of the trade policy of the Hellenistic Kingdoms and was himself exchanged as a war hostage to Rome in his youth during the Third Macedonian War between the Roman Republic and the declining Kingdom of Antigonid Macedonia – and possessed a certain degree of favorability towards not only his new residence of Rome but the newer governing faction of the Republic, known as the Philhellenists (comprising of Scipio Aemilianus, Laelius Sapiens, Manius Manilius, etc.) who aligned themselves with the philosophy of Polybius.

   Meanwhile, Ibn Khaldun, whose Muqaddimah and Economic Studies effectively covered not only a comprehensive analysis of the coinage, monetary policy, trade policy, fundamental economic principles, and trends of the Hellenistic Kingdoms but also a comprehensive review of these theories alongside addressing his own beliefs in comparison to them – which was derived of elements that were precursors to both Laissez-Faire Smithian Economics (which was, for the most part his focus) and the slightly older school of Mercantilism, advocating for diversified, primarily export based trade with an emphasis on strong national production, exports heavily outweighing imports, and modest government intervention through occasional tariffs and subsidies – among other premises. Thus, we can internalize the perspectives of Khaldun who also had to balance the widely evolving economic theories of his time within the Islamic Golden Age, which had previously been heavily, intrinsically linked to Islamic ideological theses’ and a uniquely religious equivalent of proto-welfare – yet following the departure from the Islamic Golden Age and the more fluid forms of Islamic philosophy into a far more rigid, strictly constructed view on the world and a decline in this unique concepts in the Islamic world – for it was within this Epoch and the philosophical turning point that Ibn Khaldun was forged, and where much of his understanding of the world around him was influenced by. There is also a marginal degree of information from Pliny, the Roman historian of the 1st Century CE, surrounding his economic theses on Ptolemaic Egypt in the period of economic collapse, great debt, and decline before the Roman conquest of 31 BCE, which has been excellently preserved up until the present day. Therefore, when we observe the economic syncretism of the Hellenistic Era, we are not only able to elucidate our understanding of this consequential period, but on much of the Mid-Roman Republic, and Twilight years of the Islamic Golden Age respectively (a highly enriching age in history, whose demise especially following the sacking of Baghdad in 1258, I always found to be deeply tragic for all peoples’ of the world).

   Regarding Ptolemaic Economics, Ptolemy I Soter following the resolution of the Wars of the Diadochi understood the fundamental benefits of preserving as much of the still functioning elements of the old Egyptian System, while modifying the newer elements to maintain influence abroad, and prosperity at home utilizing a synthesis of Greek and Egyptian principles. For Ptolemaic Economics were definitely characterized by a policy (early on at least, during the years of Prosperity) of selective Dirigisme – or Direction of the Economy by the State alongside security nets when necessary – which was considerably greater than that of neighboring Kingdoms (in part due to the historically centralized nature of Egyptian life), and was notable in the trend of Egyptian economics, yet was more efficient and arguably far less tyrannical than the old command-based system of Economics in the Old and Middle Kingdoms (lesser so yet still prevalent depending on the Pharaoh in the New Kingdom). Egypt during this time also adopted what we today would call a Mercantilist Economy, as they were perhaps one of the most lopsided, influential exporters in all the Ancient World (so much so that the earliest mercantilist philosophers consistently used Egypt as a prime example of Mercantilism, as the ‘School of Alexandria’, one that would even serve to inspire the philosophy of Hamilton) – so much so that much of Greece, (for a brief period before her demise) Carthage, and especially the growing Roman Republic became heavily reliant on Ptolemaic exports to provide sustenance to their populations – a fact that continued even with the economic mismanagement of the later kings, and was arguably a considerable factor in why Ptolemaic Egypt lasted far longer than any other Hellenistic nation-state before eventually being cannibalized by the Romans in 31 BCE following the Battle of Actium.

Yet, it was due to this beneficial economic standing at first, that the Ptolemaic administration was able to accumulate considerable wealth through not only Agricultural Taxes and routine levies but through revenue generated by state deals in certain cases – all of which provided unprecedented levels of funds which were utilized to construct public projects such as the Library of Alexandria. Furthermore, during the reign of Ptolemy II Philadelphus, in which Ptolemaic Egypt arguably reached its zenith in prosperity, beneficial public works, and internal improvements were constructed, alongside an attempt at a program of generous public allotments resembling social safety guarantees in the ancient world for citizens were orchestrated at the local level, yet this policy gradually withered away in the decades after his death (According to Polybius, and Cicero, who continuously addresses in numerous works the decline of the nation-state and its ties to corruption and dishonorable conduct amongst those in the possession of power).

   Now, these funds would ultimately serve to fuel the corruption and sustained mismanagement of the central government by successive, more incompetent kings, as the Ptolemies’ relationship with Rome and other nations gradually devolved from a mutually beneficial, prosperous arrangement in which a reliance on Egypt was present, to the point where, by the 1st Century BCE Ptolemaic Egypt was in a greater dependency to Rome than the other way around, for payment and funds to alleviate the immense debt which (through some unfathomable stroke of genius) was also owed to the Romans. This effectively had relegated Ptolemaic Egypt to the status of a tributary client state of Rome by the end of her existence, only for there to be a brief, dramatic attempt at a greater revival before the Kingdom’s demise in 31 BCE, and the incorporation into the newly reorganized Roman Empire. However, beyond this brilliant multi-generational market cycle that managed to cannibalize a superpower, Ptolemaic Egypt was also host to a considerable debate surrounding the nature of the economy and government policy during the late 3rd Century BCE into the following century amongst influential philosophers centered in both Athens and Alexandria, between what we shall label the Classicists and the Institutionalists – for one believed in what was literally then and what we understand now to be Classical Economics, and the other (again literally) in stabilizing institutions (mind you, within Antiquity, these mechanisms looked very different than they do now).

   For the former generally believed in a devotion to the more laissez-faire mechanisms of economic policy, as opposed to the traditional Egyptian economy, which had evolved from Strict directions’ to a fusionist policy – indicative of the genius Statecraft of Ptolemy I Soter balancing the errors and championing the breakthroughs of both schools of thought as best befitting the circumstance. Rather interestingly, between these ebbs and flows, a heavy degree of Price fluctuation occurred due to the variation in policy (and, arguably more consequentially, imperial leadership), which served to further destabilize and detriment the state of the Egyptian economy and national debt, alongside considerable inflation. This volatility was effectively captured by the writings of Cicero, who experienced them while studying in Athens and traveling throughout Greece in his formative years, where the effects of Price fluctuation were most prevalent (something, I believe, that permanently impacted his worldview). In the later years, the Ptolemaic government sought to attempt to stabilize this through far stricter price regulation, the granting of Royal monopolies, and other antiquated methods of market manipulation, and through what can be understood as abysmal implementation led to further decline and conflict with the Romans, alongside a decline in overall output amongst the farming class.

In 51 BCE, however, Cleopatra VII would attempt to reform the economic and monetary policy of the nation with the aid of Rome but succeeding events and conflicts would eventually nullify them. Ultimately, the vacillation in policy, corrupt leadership, royal instability, and an already established degree of Roman dominance over the Ptolemaic Economy led to the seemingly inevitable decline thereof. Interestingly, this dynamic especially in Ptolemaic Egypt (yet also observed to a lesser degree in Antigonid and Seleucid domains) would be the primary subject of the research and inquiries of 20th Century Russian scholar Michael Rostovtzeff – who found intellectual refuge in America following the Russian Revolution – and whose perspective upon the conflict and comparison in his The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, interestingly served to parallel the conflict between the two schools of economic thought to the contemporary conflict between Capitalism and Socialism/Statist Economics, a perspective that in his mind was (and I would content so) exacerbated and immortalized following the Russian Revolution and the subsequent events of 1918.

   Beyond Ptolemaic Economics, the Seleucid Empire sought to synthesize the Greek fundamental doctrines of economics with the pre-existing conditions of the region, while also attempting to (at least in earlier years), transition the economy from more archaic Achaemenid traditions to a fluid, trade-based economy in which trade could successfully travel in what would eventually serve as the precursor to the Silk Road. The policies enacted to do so involved not only a heavy degree of development and internal improvements across trade routes, including the construction of more secure roads, cities and sites not only for trade but also for urbanization and greater development in what would constitute (as financed successfully by trade and massive tributes from the many provinces), some of the most expansive Public Works programs of the Hellenistic Era – in which dozens of cities were erected (many with government subsidation) throughout Syria, the Levant, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and as far east as the Strait of Hormuz.

Ultimately, this policy would prove extremely successful and would, when combined with the alluring, fairly unobstructive trade policy of the Seleucid empire, entice trade and effectively fuel the Seleucid economy to prosperity up until the reign of Antiochus the Great in the 2nd Century BCE. Furthermore, under the early Seleucids, a well-mitigated coinage revival occurred, in which regulated mines for Silver, Gold, and other precious metals – while ensuring effective treasury reserves, and sound management of the economy, alongside distribution of some of antiquities most (in my opinion) illustrious coinage. These public works, and continued government revenue, were funded in part through a profitable, yet not overreaching revenue policy, which had been devised from an adaptation of the Classical Athenian Tax system (which was also designed to elicit yet capitalize upon trade, imports, and exports through the Athenian Port system) – including most notably the Pentekoste (the fiftieth tax), in which two percent of all imports and exports throughout the empire – which generated immense revenue for the Seleucid Empire for over a century and effectively guaranteed economic prosperity for much of her citizenry.

    This policy of trade and economic prosperity that was specifically tailored to the circumstances of the societies now under the control of the Seleucids continued through lower tax policy when compared to neighboring kingdoms during her early history, and the aforementioned prosperity effectively enabled for a far less severe, far less disastrous form of economic debate between the economic idealism and pragmatism of certain members of the court, and this balance was ultimately best managed (before tipping in favor of the latter realm of thought) under the reign of Antiochus III – also known as the Great. However, this period of prosperity and progress – only interrupted by brief interludes of Court intrigue – would ultimately come to a cataclysmic, yet highly gradual end, following the culmination of the Roman-Seleucid War, in which due to a plethora of factors too complex to effectively address today, was decisively won by the Romans, who were able to systemically dismantle the Seleucid government, economy, and societal autonomy through the Peace of Apamea in 188 BCE. Within this treaty, not only were significant territorial losses inflicted upon the Seleucids in losing most of Asia Minor to Roman-Vassal Kingdoms, but also in the designated payment of immense monetary and agricultural indemnities to Rome, alongside strict trade restrictions; all of which served to devalue the Seleucid currency, cause a collapse in trade stability, develop a dependence to Rome for economic prosperity, and foster great instability throughout the empire, which eventually led to the loss of much of the Eastern Provinces to invading Parthian nomads who now occupied Persia as their realm, and would continue to do so for several centuries – shrinking the Seleucid Empire to record lows. In response, the near financially destitute Seleucids would resort to a more restrictive governing philosophy, and an increase in tax rates from the pentekoste, to upwards of three percent on some products – which this, alongside an increase in the persecution of the sizable Jewish population within the kingdom, let to the Maccabean Revolt that eventually led to the restored independence of Judea for the first time since the Destruction of Solomon’s Temple nearly 500 years prior.

   Following this continued decline, with the exception of a short attempt to revive the Seleucid Economy by Cleopatra Thea in the 120’s BCE via increased Agricultural revival and internal improvements, which ultimately due to the lack of a properly managed national bank or treasury faltered – the Seleucid’s sank further and further into Destitution before the final King of the Seleucid’s, Philip II Philoromaeus (Philip the Friend of the Romans), who by this point was but a pawn of the Roman Republic, left the entire Seleucid Empire to Rome in his will. Thus ended the story of the Seleucids, one which I find particularly disheartening, for the Ptolemies (as loveable as Ptolemaic Egypt is to romantics contemporary and modern), were blessed with opportunity and resources, and fell due to the generations of incompetence and corruption amongst the leadership of the kingdom – meanwhile the Seleucid’s facilitated prosperity and fell due to the aggressive efforts of an external power – yet both with their fundamental lessons. Regarding the Antigonids in Macedonia, their rule with a few exceptions was prone from the beginning, to significantly more instability than neighboring powers and fellow Hellenistic Kingdoms – and was prone not only to several revolts from Dorian city-states but also a fair degree of corruption and dependency on both the Romans and Ptolemaic Egypt for adequate trade. However, much of the economic status quo of Antigonid Macedonia is what we could effectively antiquate to ancient corporatism, and was predominantly dictated by the conflict between the Laissez-Faire Economic tradition of many Greek city-states, with the more corporatist, monopolized industry of the Macedonian Mines and Timber fields that had traditionally driven industry in the days before Philip II of Macedon.

   Thus, this balance and conflict was also paired with increasing involvement within the Antigonid Economy by opportunistic Romans, alongside other nationalities’ merchants, who all sought to benefit from potential trade within a kingdom in definite need of external revenue. Ultimately, the Antigonids would at numerous times throughout her history – especially following the increasing dependence after the Roman-Seleucid War – attempt to become economically self-sustainable and in the process would not only experience economic crashes but aggressive policies bringing themselves into direct confrontation and conflict with the Roman Republic. This increasingly unstable state of affairs eventually resulted in the Macedonian Wars between themselves and the Romans, who, following their culmination, conquered Macedon and Greece under the capable, wise leadership of Lucius Aemilius Paullus, who was subsequently granted the agnomen Macedonius for his incorporations of the Kingdom and lands of Greece into the Republic. On another note, the immense revenue brought in following the conquest of Macedon enabled Rome to effectively abolish the Property Tax in nearly all of its forms for her citizens as a result of the historic surplus within the coffers of the Republic – an event that subsequently fueled economic expansion for the burgeoning Republic. However, beyond these three Kingdoms, there is one more noteworthy Hellenistic Civilization that arguably came closer to any other than the unaugmented dream of Alexander the Great – that being the Greco-Indian Kingdom within Bactria, Sogdiana, and much of the Indus River Valley.

   This kingdom, whose natural fusion rivaled the engineered syncretism of the Ptolemies, and the cultural exchanges of the Seleucids – had attempted to implement not only the vision of cultural syncretism and concordance between European and Asian peoples that was proclaimed by Alexander during the latter years of his campaign – with a considerable degree of success. But also, there was a considerable attempt to institute an economic synthesis and one of the closest models of what we today would consider a Mixed Economy within the kingdom, combining the fairly Lassez-Faire and traditional Hellenistic economic concepts with a policy of Welfare resembling the system instituted within the neighboring Mauryan Empire in India (who had, under the “Monk King” Ashoka, not only abolished much of the existing forms of slavery within the empire, but instituted widely accessible schools of learning and policies resembling pre-modern welfare, only to be foiled by his corrupt, incapable successors). Now, although this synthesis may have had a legitimate potential to succeed, the kingdom ultimately collapsed due to the hostile neighbors in the form of Nomadic Turkic raiders and the Kushan, routine raids upon settlements, an untimely streak of poor environmental conditions, and a rise in corrupt, incompetent management of the kingdom, which ultimately collapsed at the beginning of the 1st Century BCE – in what the renowned expert on the era W.W.Tarn proclaimed; “A Failed Experiment with the Noblest of Intentions”. In the end, despite their ebbs, flows, and unique innovations, the Kingdoms and economies of the Hellenistic Era were to be lost to the centuries – gradually either cannibalized by the Roman and Parthian Empires or withering away to archeological mystery for millennia (in the case of the Greco-Indian Kingdom).

   In conclusion, today we have been able to fundamentally and tangibly observe the Economic Principles, Policies, and Philosophies that characterized the Hellenistic World – what enabled their most glorious triumphs, and what sowed the seeds of their decline. We were able to observe the masterful synthesis of nations and schools of thought that although not eternal, did enable for a myriad of economic breakthroughs that continue to echo into the present day with a startling degree of relevancy. Furthermore, we were also able to demonstrate through the art of historiography not only the world of the Hellenistic Era, but the realities of those who transcribed it, whether it be Roman, Muslim, Russian, or Scotsman – all presented stories to tell. Regarding the degree of pertinence and relevancy, these kingdoms’ stories possess in the present day, as we ourselves embark upon the stormy sea that is the 21st Century, and as we begin to face some of the most daunting technological, economic challenges since the Industrial Revolution, it is paramount not only to innovate, but to be vigilant in the remembrance of our storied civilizational history – and to be guided by the Wisdom of the Ages, to learn and develop from the mistakes and breakthroughs of civilizations gone by – in search of a brighter tomorrow.